The Regional Effects of Four Rounds of Saudi Arabia-Iran Negotiations (Pt. 2)

Iran and Saudi Arabia made steady progress in their negotiations through four rounds of talks that took place throughout 2021 in Baghdad, Iraq, with foreign ministers from each party indicating that the conversations were constructive and could lead to a rapprochement.[1] As their dialogue continues and hopefully leads to mutually acceptable agreements, we consider the regional implications of improved relations between Tehran and Riyadh. For decades, these two Middle Eastern superpowers influenced and directed the affairs of multiple neighboring states. Accordingly, any agreement between them would undoubtedly produce ripple effects throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have not incited conflict in neighboring states experiencing turbulence and instability any time recently; however, their entrance into conflicts as opposing players repeatedly lengthened, intensified, and sectarianized the conflicts. Decades of mistrust between Riyadh and Tehran gave rise to violence and instability in the Middle East, but the current state of affairs that have been characterized by good intentions from both sides could lead to stability, security, and economic development for both countries and the wider region.

Relations between Tehran and Riyadh affect the entire Middle East in one way or another, but these effects have arguably been most prominent since 2003 in Iraq. The American invasion of Iraq and the subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party from power made the country weak and vulnerable to foreign influence. This paved the way for Iraq to become a battlefield between Iran and Saudi Arabia for years as both countries competed for influence in order to gain dominance in the country.[2] As the two states repeatedly challenged one another, it was the people of Iraq that suffered most, enduring sectarian violence, humanitarian crises, and a government unequipped to provide goods and services to its people. Since being treated as a theater for proxy warfare between Iran and the Saudi Kingdom, Iraq is in desperate need of economic and political recovery.

IDP Squatter Camp Baghdad, Iraq. (Photo: Dave Malkoff on Flickr; no alterations made.)

The recent discussions between Riyadh and Tehran that took place in Baghdad, however, signal that Iraq is actively, and so far successfully, changing its role in the Middle East. Considering that Iraq was recently accused of being a proxy for Iran by multiple countries in recent years, its ability to mediate negotiations between Riyadh and Tehran is particularly impressive.[3] Iraqi government sources and officials attributed much of this late success to personal efforts made by Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi.[4] Kadhimi was elected to be the prime minister in May 2020 after serving as the head of Iraq’s National Intelligence Service beginning in June 2016. Throughout Kadhimi’s time as the head of Iraq’s National Intelligence Service, he developed relationships with formidable contacts within the security establishments of Tehran and Riyadh, which enabled him to bring the two parties together in Baghdad.[5]

Visit to NATO by the Prime Minister of Iraq. (Photo: NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization on Flickr; no alterations made.) CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

This was not Kadhimi’s first successful attempt toward making Baghdad a bridge rather than a battlefield. In June of this year, Kadhimi was able to host a summit in Iraq between leaders of Egypt and Jordan that resulted in all three countries agreeing to deepen economic and security ties.[6] If Baghdad is to continue its role as a mediator so that Iraq can profit from regional stability, it is crucial that Kadhimi and other senior Iraqi officials maintain an independent foreign policy and balanced relations with Tehran and Riyadh.

Iraq’s role in the Middle East is evidently evolving as it acts as an interlocutor between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but the effects of the negotiations are less obvious in Yemen. Where Iraq succeeded in shifting its role from a site for violence to a site for cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Yemen has failed. Yemen has been devastated by conflict between the Iranian-aligned Houthi insurgents and the Saudi-backed Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi presidential administration for seven years now, with no clear end in sight.[7] The current focal point for both sides is the city of Ma’rib, a vital location as it is the last stronghold of Hadi’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) in north Yemen, it contains much of Yemen’s oil and gas infrastructure, it holds Yemen’s largest station for generating electric power, and it has strategic value due to its trade routes.[8] The fate of Ma’rib may well correlate with the fate of Yemen because whoever is in control of Ma’rib when the current fighting subsides will have significantly more leverage should peace talks arise.

Ruins of Old Ma’rib. (Photo: Twiga-swala on Flickr; no alterations made.) CC BY-SA 2.0

Considering the critical fighting that is ongoing in Ma’rib, as well as recent Saudi bombing campaigns in the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, the question that emerges is how do negotiations between Riyadh and Tehran affect the outlook for peace in Yemen? The KSA made its desire to exit conflict in Yemen exceedingly clear, and the decision by the Biden administration this past February to cease its support for the Saudi offensive certainly heightened those aspirations.[9] The Yemeni conflict was discussed at length during the recent dialogue in Baghdad, but no information on any developments was revealed. It is difficult to speculate how negotiations will affect the conflict considering the intense violence that is ongoing in Ma’rib, but it is likely that Iran will use its influence with the Houthis as a bargaining tool with the Saudis. Riyadh’s most pressing issue is halting missile attacks on Saudi soil from the Houthis, especially after recent missile attacks from the Houthis that killed two people in the Kingdom.[10] Any peace agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia depends on this issue, as Riyadh will likely refuse to offer any concessions to Tehran if they are unable to guarantee that Houthi attacks on Saudi soil will come to an end. If Tehran can make that promise, which would be a difficult task given that the Houthis have their own agenda, they would presumably ask for a few concessions from Saudi Arabia, including the withdrawal of their opposition to the nuclear deal, the reopening of the Sanaa airport, and perhaps a normalization of relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia.[11]

Concluding conflict in Yemen would be a major step forward for both countries and the region. However, given the incessant fighting in Ma’rib and the Saudi bombing campaign in Sanaa, that prospect appears unlikely to occur. Saudi Arabia and Iran played a large role in extending both the duration and the intensity of the conflict by supplying arms, soldiers, and rhetoric for opposing sides, but even if they were to pull out of Yemen, the central actors in the conflict would remain. The current situation in Yemen indicates that the ongoing negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iran are unlikely to produce any form of a peace agreement, but that does not mean they serve no purpose.

The antagonizing roles Iran and Saudi Arabia played in Yemen are comparable to the roles they assumed in countries experiencing instability like Iraq and Syria. Their interference in ongoing conflicts escalates, lengthens, and sectarianizes disputes as Tehran and Riyadh employ confrontational policy towards one another. However, as seen in Baghdad, any easing of tensions between the two Middle Eastern powers helps to mitigate conflicts and leads to the conditions necessary for violence to finally cease. Therefore, the mere existence of negotiations can function to alleviate tensions and strengthen regional relations even if no agreements result from the talks. Actors in Tehran and Riyadh do not necessarily need to become allies for regional stability and security to improve because even marginal progress in relations could help confine conflicts to local actors, making them shorter, less destructive, and focused on the issues at hand rather than on deeper ideological and structural divisions.

Works Cited

[1] Shabani, Mohammad Ali. “Rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran Hold Talks in Iraq.” Axios. Accessed November 12, 2021. https://www.axios.com/saudi-arabia-iran-talks-baghdad-336e32f3-1528-4782-af66-d1c281017142.html.

 [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Hassan, Kawa, Adnan Tabatabai, and Desirée Custers. “From Messenger to Host – CARPO e.V.” Accessed November 12, 2021. https://carpo-bonn.org/en/from-messenger-to-host/.

 [7] Global Conflict Tracker. “War in Yemen.” Accessed November 12, 2021. https://cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen.

 [8] Al-Ashwal, Ammar. “The Wealth of Ma’rib Is Reshaping the Future of Yemen.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed November 12, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/85133.

 [9] Stepansky, Joseph. “US Ending Aid to Saudi-Led Forces in Yemen, but Questions Persist.” Accessed November 12, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/7/us-ending-support-to-saudi-led-war-in-yemen-questions-persist.

[10] [11] Mabon, Simon. “Yemen: Talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran Offer Hopes for an End to Bitter Seven-Year Civil War.” The Conversation. Accessed November 12, 2021. http://theconversation.com/yemen-talks-between-saudi-arabia-and-iran-offer-hopes-for-an-end-to-bitter-seven-year-civil-war-169377.