Saudi-Iran Negotiations Have Made Steady Progress; Why is this Happening Now? (Pt. 1)

Many leading political theorists and experts in the MENA region have referred to the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the past few decades as a new Cold War in the Middle East.[1] Much like the United States and the Soviet Union during the second half of the twentieth century, Iran and Saudi Arabia have not directly engaged with one another in war but instead competed for spheres of influence and regional dominance using statecraft and proxy warfare in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Tensions between the two great powers went through cycles of highs and lows over the past few decades, but turned sour in 2016 when Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic relations with Iran. This move came after Iranian protesters attacked Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran in response to the Saudi kingdom’s execution of revered Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr.[2] Recent developments, however, caused the two powers to engage in dialogue with one another again, culminating in four rounds of productive negotiations on a range of issues thus far between each nation’s foreign minister.

photo: Sergey Lavrov and H. Amir Abdollahian. (Photo: Russian Foreign Ministry on Flickr; no alterations made.) CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.

The turn towards diplomacy between Saudi Arabia and Iran came as a surprise to many, especially considering Riyadh’s assertive foreign policy toward Iran in recent years, confronting them in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Perhaps even more surprising is the constructive tone the foreign ministers of each country took in reference to the dialogues. Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian at the beginning of October said, “The Iran-Saudi dialogue is on the right track… We have achieved results and agreements, but we still need more dialogue.”[3] Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud echoed a similar sentiment, stating on October 8th that “These discussions are still in the exploratory phase. We hope they will provide a basis to address unresolved issues between the two sides and we will strive and work to realize that.”[4] While this is welcome news to regional and international communities, it left many wondering why dialogue is happening now, and why is it now that talks seem productive after years of gridlock and division?

photo: Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud Signs Guest Book. (Photo: U.S. Department of State on Flickr; no alterations were made.) CC BY 3.0.

To understand why the conditions for a healthy dialogue are now in place, it is necessary to look at regional developments that influence each country’s incentives for engaging in talks. This article considers these three interrelated developments to be crucial for setting the stage for a bargaining process: the failure of former US President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran; Saudi Arabia’s weariness toward conflict, especially the civil war in Yemen; and a growing desire from both sides for regional reconciliation and economic growth. Neither side explicitly stated any reasons for their willingness to improve relations, so it is important to acknowledge that the aforementioned factors are conclusions based upon evidence and reasoning.

The first and perhaps most critical development that encouraged Saudi Arabia and Iran to engage in dialogue was Donald Trump’s ineffective “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. Trump’s strategy of employing intense economic sanctions to cripple the Iranian economy and attempt to force Tehran to make concessions can be considered a failure for multiple reasons. First, Trump did not secure a second presidential term. Even if his policy was considered successful while he was in office, losing the re-election signaled the failure of Trump’s foreign policy campaign since current president Joe Biden has no interest in furthering Trump-era policy. The Biden administration desperately wants to continue JCPOA talks, but so far Iran’s new president Ebrahim Raisi has resisted, as it is speculated that he believes the longer he waits, the more leverage he will have as Iran continues to make strides in their nuclear capabilities. Due to the new Biden government, Saudi Arabia can no longer rely on the US to aggressively confront Iran, causing them to rethink their strategy toward Iran. Additionally, Iranian President Raisi stated that his intentions to exit economic isolation by eliminating US sanctions and improving relations with Saudi Arabia would improve Iran’s image in the region and the world, which he hopes would push Biden to ease some sanctions on the country regardless of a future JCPOA.

The second reason Trump’s maximum pressure campaign failed is that sanctions placed on the Iranian economy—meant to incapacitate the Islamic Republic’s ability to project military power in the Middle East—instead led to an enhanced Iranian regional military profile. Throughout Trump’s campaign, Iran strengthened its ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon, President Assad in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen who have recently caused the most economic damage to Saudi Arabia out of any of the relevant parties.[5] This escalation of Iran’s regional military interventions demonstrates that a confrontational approach to Iran would likely exacerbate conflict and further damage the Saudi economy. Conflict and attacks on Saudi soil, either from Iran or its proxies, would work against Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” of reducing the Kingdom’s dependency on oil, strengthening its economy, and improving public service sectors within the next decade.[6] If the KSA truly wants to realize Vision 2030, it would be wise to engage in dialogue with Tehran, thereby greatly reducing its risk of economic and security trouble.

Photo: Donald Trump. (Photo: Gage Skidmore on Flickr; no alterations made.) CC BY-SA 2.0

Finally, the maximum pressure campaign also failed due to the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, a move that paved the way for Iran to substantially ramp up its production of enriched uranium. Iran went from a uranium stockpile holding at most 202 kilograms (kg) of uranium with a cap of 3.67 percent enriched uranium under the JCPOA in 2015, to its current stockpile of almost 3 tons of uranium (more than 14 times the allowed amount under the JCPOA), with 62.8 kg enriched to 20 percent purity and 2.4 kg enriched to 60 percent purity.[7] This significant increase in uranium and enriched uranium brings Iran ever closer to the nuclear weapons-grade level of 90 percent uranium purity, a prospect that is likely pushing the Saudis to come to the bargaining table before Iran achieves that capacity. Additionally, as Iran continues to make strides in its nuclear capabilities, it strengthens Washington’s resolve to continue JCPOA talks, which if successful, would also reduce the economic leverage Saudi Arabia holds over Iran.

The futility of Donald Trump’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran improved the Islamic Republic’s status in the region and forced Riyadh to rethink their strategy towards Tehran, but that alone does not explain why Saudi Arabia agreed to re-engage with Iran. Consider the Saudis’ weariness toward conflict in general, especially with the Houthis in Yemen. The current civil war in Yemen is further damaging the prospects of the KSA realizing its Vision 2030 plan, as the Kingdom continues to hemorrhage money into the conflict while simultaneously defending daily missile and drone strikes from the Houthis on airports, military bases, and oil installations within the kingdom.[8] A tighter relationship with Tehran could encourage the Iranians to convince the Houthis to lay down their arms and negotiate with the Kingdom. In exchange for Iran mitigating Saudi’s conflict with the Houthis, Riyadh could normalize relations with the Syrian government.[9] If Saudi Arabia and Iran both want to focus on developing their economies and repairing regional relationships, productive dialogue between them with a focus on reconciliation is the best path forward.

The COVID-19 pandemic made many actors in the Middle East reconsider their foreign policies, shifting away from costly foreign intervention to a focus on economic, investment, and trade opportunities. The regional desire for reconciliation and economic growth has undoubtedly pressured actors in Tehran and Riyadh to seek cooperation. The shift in US foreign policy from confrontational to collaborative that came as a result of the new Biden administration pushed Saudi Arabia to adopt a similar tone, especially considering the progress Iran has made with its nuclear capabilities. These factors, combined with Saudi Arabia’s desire to exit conflict in Yemen, created the conditions necessary for Saudi Arabia and Iran to come together at the bargaining table once again to seek agreements and results that could lead both countries on a path toward economic development and stability.

Works Cited

[1] Gause, F. Gregory. “Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement? The Incentives and the Obstacles.” Brookings (blog), November 30, 1AD. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/saudi-iranian-rapprochement-the-incentives-and-the-obstacles/.

[2] ANI News. “Iran, Saudi Arabia Agree on Range of Issues in ‘Constructive Dialogue’: Iranian Foreign Minister.” Accessed October 15, 2021. https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/iran-saudi-arabia-agree-on-range-of-issues-in-constructive-dialogue-iranian-foreign-minister20211008224429/.

[3] “Iran Says Saudi Talks on ‘Right Track’ but More Dialogue Needed.” Accessed October 15, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/8/iran-saudi-arabia-talks-on-right-track.

[4] “Saudi Confirms First Round of Talks with New Iranian Government | Reuters.” Accessed October 15, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-confirms-first-round-talks-with-new-iranian-government-2021-10-03/.

[5] [6] [8] [9] Kizilaslan, Merve Ayse. “Saudi-Iranian Diplomacy Has Begun to Intensify. What Does It Signify?” Saudi-Iranian diplomacy has begun to intensify. What does it signify? Accessed October 29, 2021. https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/saudi-iranian-diplomacy-has-begun-to-intensify-what-does-it-signify-50477.

[7] “Iran Says It Has 6.5 Kg of 60%-Enriched Uranium, Inching Closer to Weapons-Grade | The Times of Israel.” Accessed October 29, 2021. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-says-it-has-6-5-kg-of-60-enriched-uranium-inching-closer-to-weapons-grade/.