Analyzing the Potential of Israeli-Omani Normalization
/Introduction:
On September 15, 2020, the United States, under President Donald Trump, mediated an agreement known as the Abraham Accords, which formally normalized diplomatic relations between the State of Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain. What was initially a trilateral agreement between Israel and two of the Persian Gulf’s wealthiest states expanded in the subsequent months to also include Morocco and Sudan. As such, the Abraham Accords marked one of the most significant developments in the Arab-Israeli peace process in decades. Today, three years since the Accords’ ratification, rumors have been circulating of other Arab states in the region either formally signing the agreement or otherwise normalizing their relations with Israel. Recent developments in the Sultanate of Oman lead some experts to believe that the Sultanate may be the next Middle Eastern state to normalize and establish diplomatic relations with Israel. This article will outline and analyze the recent diplomatic developments between Israel and Oman and what diplomatic normalization could mean for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran’s evolving role as a regional power, and Omani domestic society.
Israeli-Omani Historical Relations:
Normalization:
When examining contemporary Israeli-Omani relations, it is imperative to understand the two states’ historical ties. Unlike Jordan, Sudan, and Egypt, which have at some point formally declared war on Israel, Oman has never faced Israel on the battlefield. As a result, Israeli-Omani relations have always remained relatively amicable compared to more ardently anti-Zionist states like Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. For example, in October 2018, two years before the signing of the Abraham Accords, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu paid a surprise visit to Oman, where he met with its then-leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Said (AP 2018). Additionally, in September 2020, Oman formally welcomed Bahrain’s decision to enter the agreement and normalize its relations with Israel, while other Middle Eastern states opposed the peace process from its very inception (Reuters 2020). Most recent to the writing of this article was Oman’s decision in February 2023 to allow Israeli planes to fly through its sovereign airspace, thus considerably shortening the flying times between Israel and popular Asian destinations (AP News 2023). Ultimately, these moves between the states are indicative of Oman not just tolerating Israel’s existence but overtly recognizing and legitimizing its sovereignty.
Conflict:
While Israeli-Omani relations have generally remained cordial, this is not to say that they have proven frictionless. After all, Oman never went so far as to sign the Abraham Accords and continues not to recognize Israel (Reuters 2021). Animosity also exists in the private sector as in November 2022, Salam Air, an Omani low-cost airline, withdrew from the biennial Bahrain International Airshow in protest of the participation of Israeli companies (Middle East Eye 2022, Exhibitor List). Oman’s Foreign Minister, Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, later justified Salam Air’s withdrawal stating that “his country will not enter into relations or conclude normalisation agreements with Israel, calling for a just settlement of the Palestinian cause” (Middle East Eye 2022). Subsequently, in December 2022, just one month after Salam Air withdrew from the biennial Bahrain International Airshow, a few members of Oman’s lower house of parliament headed a press conference for a draft resolution to criminalize all ties with Israel (Jerusalem Post 2022). This draft resolution was ultimately not approved by the upper house nor signed by the Sultan, thus preventing it from becoming law. Nonetheless, such developments are indicative of the dichotomy that exists between Israel and Oman as the Sultanate pursues normalization vis-à-vis policies while simultaneously hindering the normalization process by withdrawing from airshows and criminalizing ties with Israel (The Times of Israel 2023). At best, such opposing policies highlight the precarity of Oman’s situation and serve as examples of the Sultanate attempting to save face to retain respect and ties to much of the Arab world. At worst, Oman’s contradictory policies could be evidence of diplomatic indecisiveness and incompetence.
The Implications of Israeli-Omani Normalization on Regional Peace:
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
With a preliminary understanding of the background of Israeli-Omani relations, we are better equipped to analyze and understand the implications Israeli-Omani normalization would have on regional peace. Contrary to popular belief, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a millennia-old conflict but rather one whose roots go back to as recent as the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite being a fairly contemporary conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has grown to define much of Middle Eastern relations as its parties have continuously quarreled through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, resulting in considerable bloodshed. As such, the Israelis and Palestinians have been presented with countless peace proposals and compromises in an ongoing attempt to resolve the conflict peacefully. These peace proposals, which have all failed, make no substantive mention of Oman since it is not a belligerent in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In an interview I conducted with Ambassador Marc Sievers, who served as the Ambassador of the United States of America to Oman from 2016 to 2019, the Ambassador stated that it is “incorrect to assume that normalizing Israeli-Omani relations would somehow result in significant gains in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, given that Oman is not a formal party to the conflict” (Amb. Sievers 2023). In contrast to Ambassador Sievers’ position, Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to emphasize that increasing Israeli-Arab cooperation could lead the Palestinians to feel more pressured to settle the conflict (Lex Fridman Podcast #389). The reality is that these statements are very likely just an attempt by the Prime Minister to gain more support from the international community. Whether or not formalized Israeli-Omani relations would make any tangible improvements on the ground remains yet to be seen. However, given Oman’s non-partisanship, and broader insignificance to the conflict, I find it exceedingly unlikely for normalization to result in tangible change in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Despite this analysis, some may rebut and cite how Oman has historically stood in solidarity with the Palestinians on United Nations votes and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) Movement. However, it is imperative to note that these are relatively ostensible positions given the lack of enforcement and the shared Arab heritage of the Omanis and Palestinians. As a result, it is inaccurate to perceive Oman’s voting record in a toothless intergovernmental organization like the UN as indicative of a formal and unwavering alliance. Moreover, while the BDS Movement may influence and satiate the hearts and minds of anti-Zionists within and beyond the Arab world, Oman’s participation in the movement has little to no effect on the Israeli-Omani normalization process, given how the Israelis and Omanis are not interdependent on one another on trade. For example, in 2013, Oman exported only $7.56K of exports to Israel (Trading Economics). Conversely, in 2018, Israel exported only $6K to Oman (OEC). Thus, while Oman may oftentimes disapprove of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinian cause, contemporary Israeli-Omani communications are more indicative of warming relations.
Iran as a Regional Power:
Analysts have also just begun to evaluate what a formal normalization of Israeli-Omani relations could mean for regional peace in the Middle East, considering Oman’s delicate relationship with Iran, the region’s most belligerent power. Iran and Oman have maintained fairly strong diplomatic relations since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, with the Sultanate historically acting as the Ayatollah’s mediator with the world (France24). More contemporarily, Iran, which possesses one of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves, has recently struck a deal with the Sultanate to build a 380 km-long oil pipeline starting in the south of Iran in Hormozgan, running through the Strait of Hormuz, and ending in the north of Oman in the Al Batinah North Governorate (Offshore Technology 2023). Thus, Iran’s diplomatic and economic ties with Oman place the Sultanate in an especially delicate position regarding the prospect of normalizing its ties with Israel, a nation that the Islamic Republic refers to as the “Little Satan.” Given Oman’s relationship with Iran, and Iran’s antithetical opposition to Israel and Zionism, normalization of Israeli-Omani relations would unquestionably worsen the Sultanate’s relationship with Iran, as it would further legitimize Israel’s right to exist, which would continue to diminish the already decreasing anti-Zionist positions held by some Middle Eastern governments.
To better understand how Israeli-Omani normalization would affect Oman’s delicate relationship with Iran, one must look no further than Bahrain’s relationship with the Islamic Republic. Before Bahrain even signed the Abraham Accords in September 2020, Iran was quick to condemn the Gulf State’s move to normalize its relations, calling Bahrain’s rulers now partners “to the crimes of the Zionist regime” (The Times of Israel 2020). Thus, should Israel and Oman establish diplomatic relations, it is expected that Iran’s government will similarly denounce the normalization process. In fact, given that Oman serves as Iran’s diplomatic liaison to much of the world, Iran will likely perceive the normalization process as an ally turning their back on the Islamic Republic and another example of the “Great” and “Little” Satans exerting their influence in their affairs. However, such turmoil within the Iranian sphere resulting from Israeli-Omani normalization would prove beneficial for the West, namely the US, as the US would have gained another ally in the region to counter Iran’s regional and aspiring nuclear belligerence. Finally, Oman’s unique position with Iran and its warming relations with Israel may explain the Sultanate’s seemingly illogical move to criminalize ties with Israel in January 2023 while opening their airspace to Israeli flights just weeks later as a way to save face and to retain respect and ties to much of the Middle East (The Times of Israel 2023; AP News 2023).
Omani Domestic Society:
While the Omani government’s actions indicate a warming of relations with Israel, it is essential to note that Oman’s domestic society still contains significant segments that are not friendly toward Israel. In that same interview with Ambassador Sievers, the Ambassador emphasized that it is incredibly unlikely for Oman’s domestic society to be wholly receptive toward formally normalizing ties with Israel. Ambassador Sievers further specified that while segments of Oman’s population, mainly the elites and those living in Muscat, see the financial benefits that would accompany such normalization, the reality is that the broader Omani public does not share their views. Moreover, since the death of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, the Sultanate’s society has grown increasingly more Islamic, not less, thus further complicating the possibility of normalizing Israeli-Omani relations (Amb. Sievers 2023).
For example, in August 2021, shortly after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan led to a Taliban takeover, Oman’s Grand Mufti described the takeover as the “fulfillment of God’s sincere promise” (Middle East Eye 2021). While official diplomatic talks have not yet occurred between Oman and Israel, it is exceedingly doubtful that the majority of a nation’s populace whose most esteemed legal scholar openly praises the Taliban would be receptive to normalizing ties with the world’s only Jewish state. Moreover, the aforementioned decision in December 2022 by a few members of Oman’s lower house to present a draft resolution criminalizing all ties with Israel serves as further evidence of Oman’s animosity toward normalizing its ties with Israel and could very well be indicative of the Sultanate attempting to reconcile its relationship with Iran.
Additionally, the recent scandal and demonstrations that occurred following the emergence of a closed-door meeting between Libya’s Foreign Minister, Najla el-Mangoush, and her Israeli counterpart, Eli Cohen, in Rome should not be ignored as it could serve as an example of what may come from increased Israeli-Omani normalization (Washington Post 2023). More specifically, in August 2023, a secret meeting was held between the Israeli and Libyan Foreign Ministers, which, upon coming to light, led Libyan demonstrators to take to the streets in Tripoli to burn tires and denounce the meeting. Mangoush, amid the backlash and presumably fearing for her safety, fled Libya for Turkey. Unlike Oman, Libya has been far more ardently opposed to Israel’s existence, particularly under Muammar Gaddafi. However, the recent backlash following the closed-door meeting indicates an ever-present anti-Israeli sentiment amongst segments of the Middle East. Given Israel and Oman’s somewhat amicable relations, I find it unlikely that Omanis would react similarly to the Libyans should they become aware of Israeli-Omani normalization. However, the recent backlash should nonetheless serve as a reminder for diplomats and negotiators to proceed cautiously when discussing the possibility of Israeli-Omani normalization.
Conclusion:
Currently, there remains uncertainty as to whether or not Israel will be able to establish diplomatic relations with Oman. However, what does remain certain are the high stakes for Israel, Oman, and the broader region should a formal agreement be signed. While important figures and segments of Omani society wish to move forward with Israeli normalization, Tehran, the Palestinians, and some Omanis, particularly those living outside of Muscat, do not. Thus, it is impossible to predict with absolute certainty whether a formal Israeli-Omani normalization will be signed. However, should a formal agreement be signed, the following are fairly certain to occur: (1) Tehran would feel threatened as the fundamentalists would interpret such an agreement as another instance of the West and Israel disrupting its continually failing attempts to remain a regional power vis-à-vis its diplomatic relationship with Oman; (2) the Palestinians would feel betrayed as they would see their fellow Arabs establishing ties with their enemy; (3) some domestic Omani strife would also likely occur as those Omanis more ardently opposed to Israel would be ideologically opposed to the agreement.
Additionally, Oman’s recent warming of relations with Israel and rumors of a normalization agreement can be seen as laying the groundwork for a formal normalization agreement between Israel and other Arab states, most notably Saudi Arabia. Rumors do exist of the Saudis meeting with the Israelis behind closed doors to discuss a normalization agreement. While these rumors remain unofficial, the fact that Israeli-Saudi interactions have yet to be confirmed conveys the situation’s precarity, as the Saudi government remains apprehensive about not just normalizing its relations with Israel but discussing the very idea of it openly on the international stage. It remains likely that should Israel formalize its relations with Saudi Arabia, it would pave the way for not just an Israeli-Omani agreement, but for a potentially broader Israeli-Arab normalization process.
Finally, regardless of whether Oman and the Saudis decide to normalize their relations with Israel, the international community, and especially Israel, should respect their decision. Given the fairly amicable relations between Israel and Oman, particularly among the wealthy class, it would be inaccurate to accuse Oman of pure, unadulterated antisemitism and anti-Zionism should their governments decide not to normalize their relations with Israel fully. Instead, such a decision would presumably have been based on diplomatic calculus, weighing the costs and benefits of such an agreement on factors including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, and especially Oman’s domestic society.
