The MENA News Guide: Part I

By: Melissa Martin

Despite being a region of dynamic growth and perpetual change, original and accurate reporting on the Middle East can be surprisingly scarce at times. It is not uncommon to read the daily news emanating from major Western outlets and find largely homogenous content. Plus, today’s media has an ugly habit of regurgitating and recycling claims made in the press circuit, and this is especially true of coverage of the Middle East where fact and fiction often mingle (see the viral story about the man too handsome for Saudi Arabia).

However, those seeking to delve deeper now have access to an expanding network of independent media outlets in the Middle East - many of which have only recently realized the right to a free press - if only they knew where to look. Thus, to promote a more complete spectrum of regional affairs, we will begin a blog series featuring media outlets we hope to be unique and engaging to readers. These posts will examine a variety of subject areas - including general news, women’s rights, technology, art, etc. These outlets feature a variety of viewpoints which serve to create a more accurate picture of this complex region.

This week, we kick things off with a collection of general news outlets:

Al-Sharq al-Awsat: This publication is often considered the leading Arab daily paper. It is produced in London, where it was established in 1978 with approval from the Saudi royal family. The paper is noted for its support of the Saudi government, and considered a conservative outlet in the region. Al-Sharq al-Awsat has a network of correspondents and bureaus throughout the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the United States, producing a distinctive global perspective on regional and international events.

Website: www.aawsat.net

Facebook: asharq alawsat - Leading Arab International Daily News

Twitter: @aawsat_eng

Al-Arabiya: This webpage corresponds to the pan-Arab television news channel Al-Arabiya, which carries news, current affairs, business and financial markets, sports, talk shows, and documentaries. The site is Saudi-owned, and has been accused of having a pro-Saudi bias. It is regarded as one of the most popular sites in the region. Al-Arabiya provides translated news articles and English subtitles to video clips on its English webpage.

Website: www.english.alarabiya.net

Facebook: Al Arabiya English

Twitter: @alarabiya_Eng

Al-Monitor: The concept behind Al-Monitor is unique and beneficial to readers looking to discover sources beyond the English-speaking press circuit. The site has partnerships with two-dozen major news outlets in the region; it pulls pressing articles from these sources daily and translates them into English. It then supplements the pieces with original reporting and secondary-coverage for English viewers. Its list of contributors features former reporters for The National, Foreign Policy, and USA Today. The site claims to cover the “pulses” of Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, and Turkey.

http://www.al-monitor.com

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/almonitor

Twitter: @AlMonitor

Magharebia: This news outlet focuses on current events in North Africa and the Maghreb, namely Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya, and Algeria. The website is unique in publishing all articles in Arabic, French, and English. The website organizes stories by country, as well as in an archive format. It is open to article comments, and maintains an online discussion forum called ‘Zawaya’ which features panel debates on a variety of topics. Magharebia has played an active role in original reporting on issues in the Maghrib since its establishment in 2004.

Website: www.magharebia.com

Facebook:Magharebia

Twitter: @magharebia

Tehran Bureau: Founded in 2008, this “virtual" bureau works to connect journalists, Iran experts, and readers in regard to Iran and the diaspora. Contributors attempt to offer some sort of independent coverage in a regime where little exists. Tehran Bureau established an editorial partnership with Frontline PBS in 2009, and offers a press roundup, commentary, features, art and a forum for discussion.

Website: www.magharebia.com

Facebook: Tehran Bureau

Twitter: @TehranBureau

The Daily Star: The Daily Star is an English publication based in Beirut, Lebanon. The daily has a large online readership mainly from North America, Europe, and Australia. In 2009, its website registered more than 80,000 unique visitors per day. The Daily Star online edition is the Web's leading source of Lebanese and regional news, redesigned to offer breaking news and on-the-spot follow-up. The site publishes pieces regarding news, opinion, sports, business, culture. technology and entertainment.

Website: www.dailystar.com/lb

Facebook: The Daily Star

Twitter: @DailyStarLeb

Al-Jazeera: This is the English-language website of the Qatari broadcast network of the same name. Al-Jazeera is arguably the leading Arab broadcast news network, and gained worldwide attention for its live coverage of the war in Afghanistan. The website covers the major facets of news, as well as human rights, business, and opinion pieces. The organization is notable for its global news coverage on six continents. Although it became independent from the Qatari government in 2011, some criticize Al-Jazeera for still having a pro-Qatari bias.

Website: http://www.aljazeera.com

Facebook: AL Jazeera English

Twitter: @AJEnglish

Jadaliyya: Jadaliyya is a free online magazine that provides a unique source of insight and critical analysis that combines scholarship, advocacy, and local knowledge on the Middle East. The website features blog posts, reports and submissions by academics, journalists, activists, and artists about the Middle East. Reports are organized by country as well as topic, including reform, gender, refugees and culture to name a few.  Jadaliyya’s reports are well known, being referenced in such newspapers as the New York Times, as well as showing up in academic settings. Overall, Jadaliyya is an all inclusive source with an academic edge.

Website: http://www.jadaliyya.com/

Facebook: Jadaliyya

Twitter: @jadaliyya

Did we forget any good ones? Let us know in the comments!

Plus ça Change

Though Mubarak is gone, the relationship between Washington and Cairo is mostly unchanged

by David Weinberg, Non-Resident Fellow, UCLA CMED

It has been more than two years since the people of Egypt rose up and tossed out the government of Hosni Mubarak. In the process, President Obama helped end the old regime by insisting in private that Mubarak step aside to make way for new leadership.

We tend to speak of the events that took place in Egypt during the Arab Spring as a revolution, one with major consequences for Egyptian political life and also for Egypt’s relations with the United States. However, in many regards it is also instructive to reflect on just how little has actually changed.

Egypt still serves as a key American ally in the fight against terrorism and in Washington’s strategy toward the region. During the war last year between Hamas and Israel, the Egyptian government still served as America’s most important partner for mediating between the parties.

As was the case before the revolution, the United States currently views Egyptian needs through a prism of what is good for Israel. US officials worry more now about the fate of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, but the treaty still stands. In addition, recent reports suggest that the new Egyptian government remains concerned to about preventing smuggling through the Sinai border.

Egypt still receives an enormous amount of American foreign assistance, more than almost any other country in the world. Still, most of this aid goes to the military and government of Egypt rather than to civil society. And in spite of what Secretary of State John Kerry said in his recent visit to Cairo, US aid to Egypt is not conditioned on democratization in any sort of meaningful, effective way.

The reason this is important is that Egypt’s new leaders continue to govern in a manner that rigs the rules of political competition so that the opposition is always at a strategic disadvantage. Although the Muslim Brotherhood continues to express their support for an open and democratic system, their hypocrisy is on full display when they use the same apparatus of repression that was established by the old regime against peaceful protestors.

Therefore, Egypt’s opposition faces the same classic dilemma of whether to boycott the upcoming elections or to participate in them even after the fall of Mubarak. It seems that America’s true sympathies are with the opposition, but American policy continues to display a bias in favor of the Egyptian government.

Of course, from Washington’s perspective much has changed as well. Americans harbor deep distrust toward the Egyptian president regarding his true intentions for the long term, and they are right to do so. Egypt is in serious need of an economic rescue package from the US and from the International Monetary Fund, and the need for such a package today is much greater than it was during the old regime. US officials are frightened that either continued chaos or Islamist hegemony without end will be the likely outcome of current events in Egypt

These changes raise the stakes for reaching a sustainable US–Egyptian strategic understanding, but America’s leverage over Cairo remains limited. Americans continue to prioritize Israeli needs over Egyptian ones and domestic priorities over international ones. And at the end of the day, state interests remain surprisingly constant.

This article was originally published on The Majalla.

Dr. David Andrew Weinberg is a Non-Resident Fellow with UCLA’s Center for Middle East Development. He previously served as a Professional Staff Member for Mideast affairs at the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the US House of Representatives.

Lessons of the Gaza War

By Steven L. Spiegel

Now that the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas has begun to take effect (at least for now), it's time to begin to assess the outcome of the war, and where we go from here.

1. The big star and game changer is the Iron Dome anti-missile defense system. Without it, there would have been many more Israeli casualties, and the Netanyahu government would undoubtedly have sent ground troops into Gaza. Look for the immediate hot topic in security circles to be anti-missile defense systems, and look for American aid to Israel to increase on this front. President Obama has already indicated his support.

2. Israel often has a hawkish reputation, but it is amazing that it has watched as Hamas and Hezbollah on its southern and northern borders gradually escalated missile capabilities. We Americans wouldn't have done that if some group developed much less of a capability on our Canadian or Mexican borders, let alone both. Look for Israeli hawks and doves to both argue that their analysis was correct, and recommend policies accordingly.

3. Hamas is a big winner. Even in the last hours of the conflict, it was still capable of attacking Israel. Look for an enhanced Hamas prestige among Palestinians and in the Arab world. More troubles for the U.S., Israel, and the Palestinian Authority.

4. But, at least in the short term, look for a longer term truce and the dramatic reduction of missiles from Gaza raining on Israel, and therefore a limit on Israeli retaliations. Look for both sides to declare victories; greater standing for Hamas, and enhanced deterrence for the Israelis.

5. The new Islamist Egyptian government performed well in becoming the main sponsor of the cease-fire agreement, but the Sinai -- the conduit for arms to Gaza -- has become more lethal than ever. Look for pressure to increase on Egypt to do something about Sinai, and for quiet discussions calling for the addition of western advisers to help to regain Cairo's control. Egypt's role in the cease-fire and its weakness in Sinai could and should actually enhance the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty if it is handled properly.

6. Iran is a big winner. It managed to provide the missiles to Hamas via Sudan and through the Sinai that had the greatest psychological impact on both Israelis and Arabs alike by seeming to threaten Tel Aviv and even Jerusalem.

7. At the same time, the confrontation with Iran becomes more complex, as there will be mixed interpretations of the meaning of the Gaza War. On the one hand, there will be less enthusiasm for an attack on its developing nuclear weapons program among the already wary Israeli public and a significant number of security specialists, reinforced by American and European caution. On the other hand, others will argue that the Hamas arsenal suggests that a nuclear Iran would be even more dangerous. Look for intensified disputes in the months to come about a possible attack on Iran, even tougher sanctions, and more pressure on President Obama to both try to reach a negotiated settlement on that front and to consider American action.

8. Similarly, as suggested in the cease-fire agreement, there will be alleviation of the already-diminished Israeli blockade of Gaza. Look for much greater flexibility on civilian goods entering Gaza and much more attention to the passage of Libyan and Iranian arms (through Sudan to Egypt) to Hamas.

9. The Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas is a big loser. It will be more difficult than ever to bolster the Fatah leadership on the West Bank as Hamas grows in stature. The United States will be challenged to provide more economic aid and more diplomatic activity on the peace process. Look for much more attention to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process than at any time since mid-2011, when President Obama's initiative at the time quickly fizzled.

10. American efforts will be more complicated than ever because of the imminent Palestinian bid to become a non-member observer state at the UN. At least in the short term, membership will strengthen Abbas, but the missile war with Israel strengthens the possibility of Hamas leadership. The U.S. cannot afford Hamas, an ally of Iran, potentially representing Palestine at the UN, should Abbas weaken further. Look for the U.S. to try to square the circle by increasing its opposition to the Abbas UN initiative, and simultaneously attempting to strengthen Abbas through economic aid and the resumption of diplomacy on the peace process front. That might have the chance of some success if the conflict over the UN bid, now presumed to trigger diminished aid to Abbas, can somehow be resolved.

During the Gaza War, President Obama was traveling in Southeast Asia, as part of the administration's vaunted "pivot" to Asia. It's a good policy, but the Middle East followed him there. As the president contemplates new appointments in the foreign policy arena, he will have to consider that just as the U.S. necessarily begins to pay more attention to the Asian front, the conflicts and problems of the Middle East will stubbornly remain. We will be stuck with a very complex region we cannot ignore for a very long time to come.

Professor Steven Spiegel is a Professor of Political Science at UCLA and director of UCLA Center for Middle East Development.

This article was originally published in the Huffington Post.

How to End the War in Gaza: What an Egypt-Brokered Cease-Fire Should Look Like

By Ehud Yaari

Israel and Hamas are once again locked in a shooting war. Each day, hundreds of missiles fly toward Israeli cities and villages. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force has been systematically pounding the Gaza Strip, carrying out no less than 1000 strikes on Hamas military targets in the last several days. As indirect negotiations over a cease-fire progress at this moment, with active U.S. involvement, it is time to chart a course to end this round of hostilities.

Israel has set fairly modest goals for its campaign, dubbed Operation Pillar of Defense. It does not seek to topple the Hamas regime in Gaza, as it has sought in the past, nor does it want to bring about the total collapse of Hamas' military wing. As statements from senior Israeli officials indicate, the objective is a long-term cease-fire along the Israel-Gaza border. Hamas, for its part, has one objective: to stay on its feet. It is trying to inflict maximum damage and casualties in order to prove that Israel's military superiority alone will not force it to back down. With the right kind of a no-victors formula, sponsored by the United States and other international players, a deal can be reached to ensure a long-term calm.

Previous conflicts between Israel and Hamas, including the 2009 war, have been resolved, with Egyptian faciliation, through a simple formula: each side commits to refrain from opening fire as long as its adversary does the same. But these calm periods -- or tahdia, as they are called in Arabic -- have historically not lasted very long. Hamas has increasingly allowed other heavily armed terrorist groups in Gaza, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to launch attacks on Israel. And in the past few months, despite Egyptian warnings, Hamas has targeted Israeli soldiers and military outposts along the border, too.

This time, ending the conflict and restoring stability will require a different type of arrangement. The cease-fire agreement should involve other parties and contain additional checks on violence. It will have the best chance of lasting if it is primarily based on an Israeli-Egyptian agreement, supported by the United States and, possibly, by the European Union. It will be up to Hamas to adhere to the terms.

Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood-led government has showered Hamas with statements of solidarity, and its prime minister made an unprecedented visit to Gaza on the second day of the Israeli operation. But what Cairo ultimately wants is a speedy cease-fire. Despite its support for Hamas, the new Egyptian regime is reluctant to grant the group a defense guarantee or to open the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt. Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi underscored this on Friday, saying, "We don't want a war now."

Egypt knows well that ongoing support for Hamas' shelling of Israeli civilians would jeopardize the billions of dollars in international aid that its bankrupt treasury depends on -- $450 million annually from the United States, $4.3 billion annually from the IMF, and $6.3 billion annually from the EU's development bank. This explains why, despite Cairo's venomous anti-Israeli rhetoric over the past several days, Egypt did not take any serious actions beyond recalling its newly accredited ambassador from Tel Aviv. Furthermore, the Egyptian military and intelligence services are hesitant to provoke a confrontation with Israel.

Given Egypt's adversity to conflict, Egypt and Israel should strive to reach an understanding about Gaza. In doing so, they would reaffirm the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty for the post-Arab Spring era. Such an Egyptian-Israeli understanding could include several components. 
First, Egypt should broker the Israel-Hamas cease-fire at the highest political levels, rather than through behind-the-scenes talks organized by its General Intelligence Directorate. That in itself would constitute a departure from the Morsi administration's policy of putting a pause on normalization with Israel and preventing any contact with the country other than for military or intelligence cooperation. Egypt faces a choice: launching a high-level political dialogue with the Israel to obtain the cease-fire that it desires, or seeing the continuation of violence in Gaza. An Egyptian refusal to lead the political process should raise red flags in Washington.

Second, since most of the weapons in Gaza were trafficked through Egyptian territory, Cairo should agree to help prevent the reconstruction of Hamas' arsenal. For years now, Egypt has been turning a blind eye to smuggling in the Sinai Peninsula and tolerating the operation of 1200 tunnels that run underneath the Egypt-Gaza frontier. Cairo could try to shut down the tunnels and intercept arms shipments that come through the Suez Canal. Egypt, which is already domestically unstable, has every reason to prevent renewed violence by counteracting the remilitarization of Hamas and its allies.

Any agreement should also address the growing lawlessness in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, where attacks against Israel and even sometimes against Egyptian security personnel have become regular occurrences. Egypt's Operation Eagle, aimed at cracking down on insurgents there, has so far failed to dismantle the widespread terrorist infrastructure in the area. (Hamas even twice took the liberty of testing its long-range Fajr-5 missiles by firing them into the Sinai desert.) Since a number of Salafi jihadist organizations have branches in both Gaza and Sinai, for all practical purposes the peninsula is an extension of the Gaza front.

Egypt and Israel need to ensure that when the cease-fire takes hold in Gaza, terror operations do not simply pick up and move south to Sinai. Despite restrictions on Egyptian military deployments in the area, which stem from the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Israel and Egypt can work through the decade-old Agreed Activities Mechanism to allow Egyptian units to take up positions in the eastern Sinai. Israel has already consented to let Egypt introduce a mechanized brigade and commando battalions in the area. Israel could also approve the deployment of whatever Egyptian troops are necessary -- save tanks and antitank weapons -- to uproot the terrorist safe havens. Egypt won't just be doing Israel's dirty work; Cairo knows that these organizations might eventually target the Suez Canal as well.

A cease-fire agreement could also address the sensitive and important issue of border crossings. Egypt might get Israeli consent to open the Rafah terminal on its border with Gaza, not only for passenger traffic but also for trade. This could mean that Gaza would get its fuel and other commodities from Egypt, while Israel would continue to supply electricity. Egyptian ports could begin to handle the flow of goods in and out of Gaza, and Israel would gradually phase out the commercial activities that pass through the six terminals it now operates into Gaza. The move would signal the completion of Israel's 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip, slowly handing over responsibility for the area's economic needs to the Egyptian government. Egypt, which already perceives itself as a patron of Hamas, would see this situation favorably because it would grant Cairo more influence over the group. And Hamas is already pleading for this type of arrangement, seeking to end its economic dependence on Israeli goodwill.

Given its leverage over Egypt, Washington has a role to play in bringing about such a comprehensive cease-fire -- and in keeping it in place. The Obama administration should inform Morsi that, in return for the huge financial support Egypt gets from the United States, it must start ensuring stability in the region, create a dialogue with Israel that is not restricted to security personnel, prevent Egyptian territory from becoming a safe haven for weapons smugglers, and convince Hamas militants to stop lobbing missiles into Israeli towns and villages.

Reaching such a deal in the depths of a conflict will not be easy. But if the aim is anything more than a temporary break from fighting, it's a deal worth striving for.  

EHUD YAARI is a Lafer International Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a Middle East commentator for Channel 2 news in Israel.

This article was originally published on Foreign Affairs and was reprinted with the permission of the author. 

Egyptian Copts and the Arab Spring: A Revolution Lacking Relief

by Natalie Milstein

The Coptic Church comprises about ten percent of Egypt’s population and is the largest Christian community in the Middle East. However, 1.5 million Egyptian Copts now call North America, Australia, Europe and Sudan their new home. Why are the Copts leaving their ancestral homeland and will the Arab Spring bring any respite for those who remain in Egypt? 

The Coptic congregation traces its roots to the Apostle Mark, who founded the Church in Alexandria during the expansion of Christianity in the 1st century. Islam conquered the region in the 7th century making Egypt majority Muslim. Today there is no linguistic or ethnic difference between Coptic and Muslim Egyptians and both religious denominations contributed tremendously to the growth of Egyptian civil identity and politics.

In 1919, the Copts and the Muslims joined forces to overthrow the British occupation. To symbolize national unity, Coptic priests rallied support in mosques, including in renowned Al-Azhar institutions, while Imams mobilized the Christians in churches. And again in 2011, Christians and Muslims allied in opposition to Hosni Mubarak’s regime.

However, the revolution that brought down the dictator in favor of civil liberties only further entrenched disparity between the Christian and Muslim communities of Egypt. Though some argue that the relationship between the two religions has always been inherently imbalanced, a demarcated shift appeared with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s government. A Copt and a former ambassador to Egypt, Wahib El-Miniawy, asserts that deep-seated Muslim animosity towards Christians begins in elementary schools. He attributes such hateful curriculum to the ignorance of the education minister that Nasser first appointed.  

Another schism emerged after the deterioration of the relations between President Anwar Sadat and Coptic Pope Shenouda III in the 1970s; the pope saw that the regime lacked proper channels of political expression and demands for the Copts and encouraged that they turn to the Church to meet their needs. Sporadic Muslim attacks on the Christian communities, often unstopped by the army, led to further Coptic withdrawal into isolation.

Coptic emigrants living in the diaspora began meeting annually in 2004 to demand equality for all citizens, indiscriminate of religion. Year after year they call for more equality in promotions in academia, the state bureaucracy, the police, the military and the public sector. They implore the Egyptian administration to remove sectarian affiliation from government-issued documents where religion is irrelevant. Such conferences evoke ire from locals in Egypt, who perceive the Copts as a fifth column, supported by foreign powers to interfere in Egypt’s domestic affairs.

Millions of Copts partook in the Arab Spring in hopes of removing Mubarak and electing a stable, equitable democracy that would proffer Coptic Egyptians with the same civil liberties as their Muslim neighbors and temper the rise in the tide of Islamism. They waited with bated breath to see how the election of Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi would affect the Coptic Church and community.

Though he pledged to the acting pope Anba Bakhomious that he would not permit a condescending relationship between Muslims and Christians, his skirmish with the Supreme Constitutional Court over the dissolution of Parliament is not a promising indication for the Coptic congregation.

Added to a recent spate of Copt arrests for defaming Islam—in the case of Naguib Sawiris, Albert Saber, and others—the “free and fair” elections that placed Morsi in the presidency do not appear to be so free and fair. Only in an Egypt where freedom of expression is cherished can the Copts venture out of their isolation to be integrated members of society. But the current of Islamism, strengthened by the ballot box, may be too strong a competitor for the withdrawn Coptic community.